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Douglas L. Grant*
Reasonable Groundwater Pumping
Levels Under the Appropriation
Doctrine: Underlying Social Goalst
INTRODUCTION
This is the second of two articles dealing with reasonable groundwater
pumping level regulation in appropriation doctrine states.' The earlier
article reported that most appropriation doctrine groundwater codes pro-
tect senior well owners in the maintenance of reasonable pumping levels,
but the codes give little specific guidance on how to apply that criterion.
The objective of both articles is to help fill the need for a means of
measuring reasonableness.
The first article summarized notable features of the reasonable pumping
level statutes in different appropriation doctrine states and then focused
on the economic dimension of the reasonable pumping level concept. It
suggested that the pumping level statutes could be construed to set a goal
of optimum economic development, i.e., an economically efficient al-
location of the groundwater resource. The earlier article then considered
the use of cost-benefit analysis to pursue the goal of economic efficiency.
This article focuses mainly on goals besides economic efficiency. For
the sake of a convenient label, these other goals are grouped under the
heading of social goals.2 Thus, the two articles, when read together, use
an analytical framework divided into economic efficiency and social goals.
While this framework does not provide mechanical answers to pumping
level problems, the author hopes that the discussion based on it will at
least help to identify and illuminate the issues involved in pumping level
decisions.
To set the stage for discussing social goals, this article begins with a
*Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
tParts of this article are an outgrowth of research funded by the Office of Water Research and
Technology, United States Department of the Interior, as authorized under the Water Resources
Research Act of 1964 and made available through the Idaho Water Resources Research Institute,
University of Idaho. I am indebted to Professor David J. Walker, Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics and Applied Statistics, College of Agriculture, University of Idaho, for a number of useful
comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.
1. The first article is Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation
Doctrine: The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1981).
2. This label is also used in C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION 130-35 (1971). The dichotomy here between economic goals and social goals
should not be confused with the public finance theory dichotomy between private goods and social
goods. On the latter, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE THEORY AND
PRACTICE 6-7 (1973).
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brief look at the normative incompleteness of the economic efficiency
goal as pursued through cost-benefit analysis. Then comes detailed con-
sideration of possible social goals under the reasonable pumping level
statutes and related appropriation doctrine laws and traditions. The article
concludes with some general thoughts on implementing the reasonable
pumping level concept.
INCOMPLETENESS OF THE EFFICIENCY GOAL
Economic efficiency is not a self-defining concept. A useful starting
point for discussion is the Pareto criterion, which has occupied a central
position in theoretical discussions of efficiency for the last half century.3
The Pareto criterion in its pure form says that a resource allocation is
optimal (efficient) if no change could be made that would make at least
one person better off and no one worse off. Conversely, a different al-
location would be superior (more efficient) if it would make at least one
person better off and no one worse off.' As a test of whether the gov-
ernment should act to alter a resource allocation, the Pareto criterion is
highly restrictive. The status quo will almost always be Pareto optimal,
and any alternative will seldom be Pareto superior. To illustrate, suppose
that existing law protects the historic diversion levels of senior appro-
priators and that changing the law to protect only reasonable levels would
yield large net gains to society. The Pareto criterion says the change is
not superior to the status quo if, as will almost surely be the case, any
senior appropriator would consider himself worse off under it.
In response to the restrictiveness of the Pareto criterion, a variation
was developed. 5 According to this variation, a new allocation of resources
is superior to (mote efficient than) the status quo if the gainers could
compensate the losers and still be better off.6 This variation is often called
the potential Pareto improvement criterion because it requires only hy-
pothetical, not actual, compensation to those who will lose from the
change. It is hardly a value neutral decision-making tool because some
normative argument is required to justify why those who lose should have
to do so for the benefit of the gainers. 7
3. See J. HEAD, PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 3-14 (1974).
4. Id. at 5-6; A. RANDALL, RESOURCE ECONOMICS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 101 & n. 1 (1981); P. SASSONE &
W. SCHAFFER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 8-9 (1978).
5. J. HEAD, supra note 3, at 6-10.
6. A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
57 (1972); E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 390-96 (rev. ed. 1976); P. SASSONE & W.
SCHAFFER, supra note 4, at 9-11. The evolution of this criterion through several stages is detailed
in 1. HEAD, supra note 3, at 6-10.
7. B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xiii (1975). It has
been argued that the more progressive the tax structure is and the more intense competition is, the
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The potential Pareto improvement criterion underlies cost-benefit anal-
ysis.' If the dollar value of expected benefits exceeds the dollar value of
expected costs, then hypothetically the gainers could compensate the
losers and still come out ahead. In this way, cost-benefit analysis can
identify allocative efficiency, i.e., the pattern that maximizes net benefits.
Since the losers receive no actual compensation, a thorough cost-benefit
analysis will include a separate statement of how the benefits and costs
are distributed among people. 9
Following the cost-benefit analysis, a question remains: Why should
the gainers gain at the expense of the losers? If economic efficiency were
the only goal in resource allocation, this question would be ridiculous.
The simple and easy answer would be: Because it is efficient. Usually,
however, this question is not answered so easily.'0
Although the courts seldom, if ever, formally apply the potential Pareto
improvement criterion or cost-benefit analysis, they do deal with effi-
ciency arguments. The normative limits of efficiency claims have not
escaped judicial awareness. For example, in one case upstream junior
appropriators argued they should be allowed to divert water to the det-
riment of downstream senior appropriators because they could use it for
greater benefit to more people with less waste. The court rejected this
argument with the comment that "equity does not consist in taking the
property of a few for the benefit of the many, even though the general
average of benefits would be greater."" This example is not offered to
suggest that courts never allow efficiency to be pursued unless the Pareto
criterion in its pure form is satisfied, i.e., no losers, or actual compen-
sation is paid to the losers under liability or eminent domain rules. Rather,
more likely a potential Pareto improvement will result in an actual Pareto improvement (gainers but
no losers) or something close to it. E. MISHAN, supra note 6, at 393. But cf P. SASSONE & W.
SCHAFFER, supra note 4, at I I (finding the progressive tax structure argument less than completely
convincing).
8. A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, supra note 6, at 57-61; E. MISHAN, supra note 6, at xviii;
P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra note 6, at 8-12.
9. P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra note 6, at 23-24; see also E. MISHAN, supra note
6, at xviii-xix and 412-15.
10. For a comprehensive theoretical discussion of why cost-benefit analysis is indeterminate as
a criterion for shaping legal rules, see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
II. Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423, 436 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd 159 F. 651 (9th Cir. 1908) and 221
U.S. 485 (1911). Cf. Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 258 Ore. 498, -_, 466 P.2d 605, 613 (1964)
(irrigation district could not escape liability in negligence for property damage to a farmer's land
caused by leakage from its canal by showing that its canal operation substantially benefited other
farmers and the public generally, for outweighing the harm done to the plaintiff alone). The results
in both cases might have been explainable on a rationale of promoting long run efficiency by protecting
security of investment (see text infra at notes 19-21) but the courts did not speak in that language
and seemed to be concerned about something else-whether called equity, fairness, distribution, or
whatever.
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its purpose is to illustrate judicial recognition that economic efficiency is
not always the only goal in resource allocation.
Of course, a state legislature has the authority to make economic ef-
ficiency its only goal in the pumping level situation (assuming no vested
rights are taken in the process). The next section considers whether any
states have done that or whether the reasonable pumping level statutes
and related appropriation doctrine laws recognize goals in addition to
economic efficiency.
SOCIAL GOALS
The inquiry into social goals begins with distributional preferences,
the most frequently identified social goal in resource allocation literature.
Then the possibility of other social goals unrelated to distribution is
explored.
Distributional Preferences
The distinction in resource allocation theory between economic effi-
ciency and distribution has been explained as follows: "Efficiency ques-
tions relate to the size of the pie available; distribution questions to who
gets what share. "2 Both kinds of questions often will arise in the pumping
level context. The typical problem presents two choices regarding the
water in dispute: (1) leave it in the ground to provide lift for the pumps
of senior appropriators and possibly to serve other purposes such as
preventing the intrusion of saline water into the aquifer,' 3 or (2) allow
new appropriators to withdraw it for use on the surface. If senior appro-
priators are already pumping from a reasonable depth, the reasonable
pumping level statutes either prohibit juniors from lowering the depth or
allow it only if juniors pay the increased pumping costs of seniors. ' 4 If
the senior wells are operating above a reasonable pumping depth, how-
ever, the juniors will be free to pull the level down to such a depth, and
12. J. HIRSCHLIEFER, J. DEHAVEN, J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY 36 (1960).
13. The possible other functions are described in Grant, supra note 1, at 28,
14. The pumping level statutes themselves generally do not address whether a protected reasonable
level is mandatory in the sense that it cannot be lowered at all or whether a junior appropriator can
pull the level lower if he pays damages to affected parties. Other groundwater statutes may affect
the result. In the Odessa subarea of Washington, for example, groundwater regulations say that the
water table in a particular zone shall not drop more than 300 feet below the static water level as
measured in 1967. These regulations were issued under an entire chapter of the Washington Code,
chapter 90.44, which includes a safe sustained yield statute as well as a reasonable pump lift statute.
Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926), and Current Creek Irrigation Co. v.
Andrews, 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959), allowed junior appropriators to keep pumping despite
violation of senior rights upon in kind replacement of water to the seniors, although these cases
were not decided under reasonable pumping level statutes. Pima Farms is discussed in text infra at
notes 27-29. A recent Idaho case that took a similar approach is discussed in note 33 infra.
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the seniors will have to pay their own increased pumping costs. Thus,
reasonable pumping level determinations can raise not only the efficiency
issue of how the particular quantity of water in dispute should be used
but also the issue of proper wealth or income distribution between senior
and junior appropriators.
The discussion below considers distributional preferences that may
operate in pumping level situations. The general approach is to describe
different features of distributional theory and, as each feature is stated,
to discuss pumping level law in light of it. Several preliminary points
are in order. First, the reasonable pumping level statutes tend to be so
vacuously worded that frequent reference to the broader appropriation
doctrine context in which those statutes exist is unavoidable. Second, the
,inquiry into distributional preferences cannot end with identification of
the distributional effects of various appropriation doctrine laws and tra-
ditions. One must also ask whether those effects have policy significance,
i.e., whether they really represent distributional goals or are merely in-
cidental by-products of rules based on a goal of promoting economic
development. Finally, the organizational scheme below borrows from an
article by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, in which they divide
distributional preferences into those regarding wealth (or income) and
those regarding the distribution of specific goods, often called merit goods.'5
Wealth Distribution
Calabresi and Melamed suggest that all societies have wealth distri-
bution preferences, such as for more (or less) equality of distribution and
for less (or more) willingness to reward producers for their contributions
to economic development.' 6 For convenience, these examples are con-
sidered in reverse order.
Reward of producers. Although the reasonable pumping level statutes
say little explicitly about rewarding producers for their contributions,
similarly worded statutes from Colorado and Idaho are of interest for
what they say about potential conflict or tension between economic de-
velopment and protection of the diversion systems of senior appropria-
tors. ' The Idaho statute provides: "[W]hile the doctrine of 'first in time
is first in right' is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this right shall not
block full economic development, but early appropriators shall be pro-
tected in the maintenance of reasonable groundwater pumping lev-
els. . . ." The earlier article suggested that although this tension is not
expressly recognized in many other reasonable pumping level statutes, it
15. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098 (1972).
16. Id.
17. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-90-102 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1982).
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is often likely to be at the heart of pumping level disputes regardless of
the specific statutory structure in a given appropriation doctrine state.18
Concern about protecting the diversion systems of senior appropriators
could have any of several origins. First, it might represent a policy of
promoting long run economic development of groundwater by affording
security of investment,' 9 with any distributional benefits for senior ap-
propriators viewed as merely incidental or irrelevant. Second, it might
be based on the view that security of investment is a value in its own
right to be maximized, in combination with other values, under the banner
of efficiency. 20 Third, it might represent a distributional preference for
senior appropriators as a reward for pioneering the development of
groundwater in their area-a reward they are entitled to keep, at least in
large part, over time.2'
Only the last of these possibilities is significantly distributional in
orientation. Whether a policy of rewarding developers underlies the con-
cern for protecting the diversion systems of senior appropriators cannot
be determined by looking at the reasonable pumping level statutes alone.
Nor do related but more general water statutes give us guidance. 22 Thus,
it is necessary to turn to appropriation doctrine traditions.
The appropriation doctrine has long been characterized by a policy of
promoting economic development by affording security to investors in
the beneficial use of water.23 A distributional rather than economic de-
velopment objective, however, is stressed in an account of the inception
of the appropriation doctrine in the West given by Elwood Mead, the
18. Grant, supra note 1, at 14-15.
19. E.g., Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-19, 44 P. 845 (1896) ("Irrigation ... cannot be
accomplished with any degree of success or permanency without the right to divert and appropriate
water of natural streams for that purpose, and a security accorded to that right."); C. MEYERS, A
HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 6 (1971).
See also Famham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within the Framework
of the-Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 378 & n. 4 (1968).
20. See infra pp. 22-23.
21. Cf. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 154 (1974) (suggesting that most people
think it is relevant in assessing the distributive justice of a situation to consider how that distribution
came about). Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64
MICH. L. REV. 13, 32-34 (1965) discusses whether the pioneer-reward theory explains why farmers
receiving federal reclamation project water for land not in excess of applicable acreage limitations
are allowed upon sale of the land to cash in on values created by the federal reclamation subsidy.
He rejects the theory as inappropriate for modem reclamation projects where the water made available
by the project generally is not used to open new land to cultivation but to provide supplemental
water for existing farms.
22. WYO. STAT. § 41-2-109 (Supp. 1982) directs the state development commission to formulate
water plans that identify appropriate state, regional and local management goals "including the
obtaining of economic efficiency and a desirable distribution of income." The statute itself does not
list any distributional preferences, however. That task is left to the state water commission. The
commission has not completed any of its planning projects and has not yet addressed income
distribution goals. Letter from Michael Reese to Douglas L. Grant (October 5, 1981).
23. Grant, supra note I, at 23 and authorities cited therein.
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Territorial Engineer and first State Engineer of Wyoming and later Com-
missioner of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
Justice seemed to demand that when there was not water for all,
those who first used water from a stream should have the better right
to continue that use, and the doctrine of priority was the result. This
doctrine grew out of the belief of the first settlers that their claims
were superior to those of later comers, and they insisted that the
owner of the last ditch built should be the first to suffer when the
stream failed to supply the needs of all. The first builders of ditches
could not anticipate how many were to follow. Unless protected by
some such principle, the greater their success, the sooner they would
be injured by the attempts of others to benefit from their experience. 24
In reading Mead's account, it is useful to remember that the appropriation
doctrine originated in community custom and only later was given judicial
and legislative sanction.25 His reference to what "Ulustice seemed to
demand" in the minds of the first settlers appears to relate more to
distributive justice than to economic efficiency. Mead's account seems
plausible. The early settlers, many of whom already had their water rights,
were more likely attracted to the priority principle as a matter of distrib-
utive justice than as a tool to promote additional water development.
Western courts and legislatures no doubt initially sanctioned and later
continued to adhere to the priority principle because of its power to
promote economic development by affording security of investment in
water use projects.26 However, that does not necessarily mean they re-
jected the distributive facet of the priority principle stressed by Mead.
This point is illustrated by Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor,2 7 a 1926 case
involving wells that tapped an underground stream. The senior appro-
priator in that case was a farmer with several shallow wells. The junior
appropriator had a number of large wells used to supply water to irrigators
of land five or six miles away. The senior appropriator sought to enjoin
operation of the junior wells because they lowered the water level below
the reach of his wells. The court said its task was to formulate "a rule
24. E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 65 (1903). Cf. A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON,
... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH AND JUSTICE IN ARID
ENVIRONMENTS 3 (1978) ("The 'first in time, first in right' principle has been accepted, apparently,
because of a widespread belief that man is entitled to the product of his own labor and therefore to
protection against latecomers of land he has worked.").
25. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 159-
71 (1971); Phillips, The Doctrine of Appropriation: An Example of American Born Common Law,
1939 A.B.A. SECTION REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST LAW 38.
26. See C. MEYERS, supra note 19.
27. Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926). Although percolating groundwater
in Arizona is not governed by the appropriation doctrine, underground streams are. Higdon &
Thompson, The 1980 4rizona Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 621, 624-
26 (1980).
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that will permit successive appropriations of an independent underground
stream of flowing water to the point of exhaustion, and at the same time
give reasonable protection to the rights of the senior appropriator with
as little expense and hardship upon the subsequent appropriators as pos-
sible." 28 The court enjoined the defendant from interfering with the plain-
tiff's wells as then constructed, but suspended the injunction pending
acceptance by the defendant of a plan to furnish water to the plaintiff
through one of its canals on equal terms with its other customers.
The court obviously wanted to foster full development of the water.
At the same time, it rejected an argument by the defendant that the plaintiff
had no cause of action so long as he could still get water by deepening
his wells, regardless of the cost to him. The court was concerned about
"reasonable protection to the rights of the senior appropriator." This
concern had a distributive justice aspect, as revealed by the court's state-
ment that "to permit a junior appropriator, who, perhaps, obtains his
knowledge of such body of water by the pioneering explorations and
sacrifices of the first appropriator, to lower the water level and thereby
destroy or greatly impair the latter's means of diversion, including his
pumps and water containers, does not comport with justice and equity." 29
In sum, the modern reasonable pumping level statutes might be re-
garded as embracing solely an economic efficiency goal. Under this view,
the reason for giving senior appropriators some legal protection of pump-
ing levels is to afford the security needed to induce investment in ground-
water development. But only reasonable, rather than historic, pumping
levels are protected because too much security for early investors could
cut off development prematurely by exposing latecomers to inestimable
liability to senior appropriators for lowering historic pumping levels.3"
One may argue, however, that such a view of the priority principle and
the pumping level statutes is too narrow. The early history of the priority
principle reveals a distributive as well as an efficiency aspect. At least a
residue of the early conception of distributive justice described by Mead
survived as a policy of the appropriation doctrine in the Pima Farms
case. Arguably it should have a role in the modern reasonable pumping
level statutes alongside the policy of economic efficiency.
28. 30 Ariz. at __, 245 P. at 371.
29. 30 Ariz. at __, 245 P. at 373. Cf. Trelease, New Water Legislation: Draftingfor Development,
Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 385, 414 (1977)
("From the standpoint of equity and justice, it should be remembered that development takes place
over time. The first users take cheap, easily available, always available water. There is no shortage.
When more and more uses are made, shortages are created as demands increase to meet or exceed
low flow supply. Additional risks are created and additional costs must be met. It seems not unfair
for the government to place those risks and those costs on those who create them.").
30. This economic efficiency analysis of the reasonable pumping level statutes is developed more
fully in Grant, supra note 1, at 23-26.
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Equality of distribution. Economist Tibor Scitovsky has written that in
trying to ascertain the public's feelings about equality, "all one can do
is guess. ",3' The present inquiry is governed by statute, and thus legislative
feelings rather than the public's feelings about equality are primary. None-
theless, Scitovsky's statement applies: all one can do is guess about
legislative intent regarding the role (if any) of equality of distribution
under the reasonable pumping level statutes.
Some of Scitovsky's additional remarks are useful in discussing equal-
ity of distribution in the pumping level context, even though his focus is
broader. He starts from the premise that in a society such as ours where
economic incentives are preferred over coercion to get goods and services
produced, perfect equality in the distribution of wealth or income is
unattainable because of the need to reward producers as an incentive to
produce. He believes, however, the public will resent wealth and income
inequalities that are too great. If this is true, the dividing line between
what is too great and what is not becomes important. While Scitovsky
does not claim to know where the dividing line is, he identifies three
factors that determine its location. He says society is more likely to tolerate
inequalities under the following circumstances: (1) the inequalities are
correlated with merit or one's contribution to societal value; (2) people
feel they have equal chances with others of reaching the top; and (3) the
least well off are more nearly assured of the necessities of life.32
The first two factors listed prompt some comments and questions about
wealth distribution policy as it applies in the pumping level context (the
third factor will be mentioned later in the subsection on Merit Goods).
First, the old caselaw that gave senior appropriators a right to maintenance
of historic diversion systems without regard to their reasonableness 33
tended to enhance the wealth position of senior appropriators at the ex-
pense of juniors. Juniors either could not pump at all or had to pay the
increased pumping costs of seniors. The reasonable pumping level statutes
now in force narrow the wealth inequality between seniors and juniors
by allowing juniors to pump down to a reasonable level and requiring
seniors to pay their own increased pumping costs down to that level. In
31. T. SCITOVSKY, PAPERS ON WELFARE AND GROWTH 252 (1964). Scitovsky was talking
about "equity," but by that he means "if not equality, at least something that approximates it closely
enough to satisfy" the public. Id. at 251.
32. Id. at 251-53.
33. The leading example is Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933), subsequently
disapproved in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 583, 513 P.2d 627, 635 (1973) (dictum).
Recently, however, in Parker v. Wallentine, - Idaho -, 650 P.2d 648 (1982), the Idaho court
ruled that Noh still applies to domestic wells drilled before a 1978 amendment to the state groundwater
code. In other words, such wells are absolutely protected in their historic means of diversion. To
balance the right of the senior well user in the case and the public interest in maximum groundwater
development, the court denied injunctive relief but gave the senior well owner damages for increased
diversion expenses.
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other words, the modem statutes promote greater equality in the distri-
bution of wealth or income as between juniors and seniors. Do these
statutes represent merely a legislative policy of facilitating new devel-
opment by latecomers? Or, in the last half of the 20th century when areas
of underdeveloped groundwater are fewer, do they also represent a leg-
islative judgment that an earlier distributional policy of rewarding senior
appropriators for contributing to societal development now has less appeal
to justify inequality in the distribution of wealth or income?3 4
Second, to what extent in the past was acceptance of greater wealth
or income inequality between senior and junior appropriators based on a
view that latecomers had a good chance to "reach the top" by going
somewhere else with a less fully developed water supply?35 If that view
was a factor, does enough of it survive in the last half of the 20th century
to continue to justify much deference to senior diversion systems (as
distinguished from senior water rights)?
In closing as in opening this subsection, the guesswork nature of the
discussion must be acknowledged. One might question whether junior
appropriators are sufficiently less well off economically than seniors and
whether the two groups are sufficiently large or significant enough36 to
call into operation a broad societal principle such as reasonable equality
of wealth distribution. More fundamentally, one might question whether
American society is committed to such a principle.37
Merit Goods
The merit good concept comes from the field of public finance. The
concept is subject to enough debate to require some explanation of its
use in this article. Richard A. Musgrave's classic treatise on public finance
theory defines merit wants as "those which are considered so meritorious
that their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, over and
above what is provided for through the market and paid for by private
buyers." 38 Musgrave's examples are publicly furnished school luncheons,
subsidized low cost housing, and free education. Other examples are
publicly furnished police protection and museums.
34. See supra note 21.
35. Cf. Phillips, supra note 25, at 43 (characterizing appropriation doctrine property rights as a
monument to the passion of western pioneers "for justice and a legal system ... which accorded
equality of opportunity to all").
36. Distributional preferences seem to be aimed more at groups of people rather than individuals.
See B. DAVIE & B. DUNCOMBE, PUBLIC FINANCE 16-17 (1972).
37. Cf. G. LEFCOE, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAND LAW: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 6-7 (1974) (characterizing the concept of equality in this country as being, at best, more
of a commitment to a measure of mobility through competition than a preference for equal distribution
of wealth). See also J. HEAD, supra note 3, at 27 and n. 50 (questioning whether there is real
agreement in many societies on the meaning of reasonable ,:quality between the well off and the
less well off).
38. R. MUSGRAVE, THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13 (1959).
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Since merit goods entail governmental intervention into the marketplace
production and consumption of certain goods and services, more of them
are consumed than otherwise would be the case. Furthermore, the gov-
ernmental intervention occurs through the public budget, i.e., taxation
and spending to make the goods and services available to consumers on
a subsidized basis. A major source of controversy about merit goods lies
in how to rationalize or explain why the government should interfere with
consumer sovereignty in the production and consumption of goods and
services.
Among the reasons that have been advanced to justify governmental
intervention in the marketplace with respect to merit goods are the fol-
lowing: (1) government intervention is needed to correct consumer pref-
erences that are distorted by ignorance or irrationality, e.g., the view that
education should be free because the uninformed do not appreciate the
advantages to them of an education; (2) intervention is needed to correct
distributional problems, e.g., the view that education should be free so
it is available to the poor3 9 (compare Scitovsky's claim that income in-
equalities are more easily tolerated if the least well off are more nearly
assured of the necessities of life4°); (3) intervention is needed because
greater consumption of a merit good or service benefits not only the
immediate consumer but others in society, e.g., the view that education
should be free because it benefits not only the particular pupil but the
community. Different types of merit goods have been given labels cor-
responding to these three rationales, namely, corrective goods, necessity
goods and public goods.4
Many merit goods, though not all, 42 share all three rationales, as il-
lustrated by the example of free education. Some merit goods, though,
may be explainable only on a fourth and rather different ground. They
39. Why not cure the distributional problem with a monetary subsidy to the poor? "The social
philosophy of Western society appears to be such that the freedom to tolerate inequality in the
distribution of luxury consumption and saving is purchased at the cost of earmarked (specific)
subsidies which assure equality in the consumption of necessities." Musgrave, Provision for Social
Goods in J. MARGOLIS & H. GUITTON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS 124, 143-44 (1969). Musgrave
has pointed out, also, that there is an element of paternalism with in-kind rather than cash subsidies
because if the subsidy has merely a redistributional purpose, a cash payment would be better since
the recipient could then use the cash in line with his or her own preferences. R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 81.
40. Free education for the poor would also be supported by Scitovsky's second principle. See
SCITOVSKY, supra note 31.
41. The three rationales are stated and the shorthand labels suggested in J. HEAD, supra note
3, chs. 10 & I1. Although Calabresi and Melamed treat merit goods as a distributional preference,
the first and third rationales are obviously efficiency related. The same may even be true of the
second rationale, if it is viewed as an expression of interpersonal utility preferences. See Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 15 at 1094. See also R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 2,
at 81.
42. At least, Musgrave would not limit the merit good concept to cases where all three features
are present. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 81.
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may simply represent an autocratic aspect of society, i.e., a belief that
it is acceptable for some elite group to impose its preferences. 43
In the pumping level context, an analogy to merit goods can be found
in water use preferences. The earlier article noted that a number of states
with reasonable pumping level statutes also have laws that declare pref-
erences for certain kinds of water use, most commonly for domestic use.
The article also suggested that at least some of these preference laws
could be construed to affect the setting of reasonable pumping levels. 44
One example given was Oregon, where the state water resources director
is authorized to designate domestic and livestock use for first preference
in critical areas 45 and deny or limit permits for new wells that would
cause "undue interference" with existing wells. 46 If domestic use has
been designated for preferred status, arguably the economic pumping
reach of small domestic users would be highly significant in determining
reasonable pumping levels.47
A South Dakota case that came down while the earlier article was at
press seems to adopt this approach. 48 The court held that the state water
rights commission erred in granting a permit for an irrigation well and
gave as one reason that the well had a detrimental effect on the supply
to domestic wells nearby. The court added:
SDCL 46-1-5(1) states that the use of water for domestic purposes
is the highest use of water, and takes precedence if such use is
consistent with [the] public interest .... Although the Commission
is no longer required to regulate irrigation to absolutely protect arte-
sian pressure for domestic uses, reasonable domestic use must be
assured before irrigation is allowed. SDCL 46-6-6.1. There is a
"vested right" in the use of the water for domestic purposes.
SDCL 46-6-6. i does not, we are convinced, give the Commission
unbridled power to approve irrigation projects without giving con-
sideration to the maintenance of artesian head pressure as a method
of delivery. This statute merely requires a balancing of interests
between irrigation and delivery of water by artesian pressure for
domestic use.49
The latter paragraph evidences a striking receptiveness to special status
43. Id.
44. Grant, supra note 1, at 18-20.
45. OR. REV. STAT. §537.735(4)(c) (1981).
46. OR. REV. STAT. §537.620(3) (1981).
47. Of course, this would not be true of a preference statute having only a more specialized
effect. For discussion of the different kinds of water use preferences, see Oeltjen & Fischer, Allocation
of Rights to Water: Preferences, Priorities and the Role of the Market, 57 NEB. L. REV. 245, 256-
60 (1978); Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133 (1955).
48. Fraser v. Water Rights Comm'n, 294 N.W.2d 784 (1980).
49. Id. at 789.
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for domestic uses when one realizes that section 46-6-6.1 says state
officials are authorized to control the location and capacity of large wells
"for the purpose of ensuring or protecting water for reasonable domestic
use, without the necessity of requiring maintenance of artesian head pres-
sure in a domestic use well." 50 The court seems to be saying that even
though there is no "necessity" to maintain artesian head pressure in
domestic wells, it might sometimes be reasonable to do so.
A statutory preference for domestic (or other) water use that affects
pumping levels would not be a true merit good preference in the public
finance sense discussed above. With standard merit goods such as free
education and subsidized low cost housing, the governmental intervention
in the marketplace takes the form of taxation and monetary subsidies.
With water use preferences, the intervention is through governmental
regulation.
Nevertheless, some parallels can be drawn between merit goods and
water use preferences. If a preference for domestic use affects the setting
of reasonable pumping levels, the end result is similar to the merit good
situation in that governmental intervention makes water available to con-
sumers for the preferred use at lower cost (i.e., from a shallower pumping
depth) than might occur under market conditions. 5 Furthermore, a do-
mestic use preference might be claimed to rest on one or more of the
three merit good rationales stated above: (1) domestic water is a corrective
good, e.g., the unwashed do not appreciate the health or other values of
personal cleanliness; (2) domestic water is a necessity good, e.g., it is
necessary for life and should be available without (too much) regard to
personal income; (3) domestic water is a public good, e.g., its use confers
health, olfactory or other benefits on members of society due to the
immediate consumer's greater cleanliness. Instead, a domestic use pref-
erence might be based on the fourth explanation for merit goods stated
earlier, i.e., it may simply represent an autocratic aspect of society in
which it is considered acceptable for some elite group to impose its
preferences.
Viewing water use preferences as akin to the public finance concept
of merit goods is unconventional. If correct, though, such a view could
affect pumping level decisions by helping to focus the debate about the
legitimacy of water use preferences. These preferences are sometimes
criticized for blocking economic progress by sheltering low value uses
from market forces. Whether a preference is or continues to be warranted
may, of course, be affected by marketplace economics. The merit good
50. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). See note 33 supra
for another recent case illustrating special treatment for domestic wells.
51. Cf. J. HEAD, supra note 3, at 254-56 (suggesting no reason exists why a merit good policy
could not be implemented by regulation rather than taxation and monetary subsidy).
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parallel should make clear, however, that the debate must also extend to
whether the preferred water use has significant corrective good, necessity
good, or public good aspects, and to the propriety of governmental in-
tervention in the marketplace based on those grounds or, possibly, on
autocracy grounds alone.
Another example-one that is hard to classify within the analytical
framework used in this article-may now be considered. A general tra-
dition that is sometimes codified into law12 views family farms as desirable
even though larger corporate farms might be more economically efficient.
The tradition may have anti-monopoly (i.e., efficiency) and wealth dis-
tribution aspects, as well as a merit good aspect representing a judgment
about the value to society of a certain kind of life that transcends mar-
ketplace pricing. 3 In the pumping level context, a general family farm
policy may come into conflict with a goal of economic efficiency, at least
if efficiency means maximizing net benefits as measured in the market-
place.54 Because of economies of scale, a large irrigator may be able to
afford to pump from a considerably greater depth than a small one. 5 If
pumping levels are geared to the economic feasibility of large farms,
small ones may be driven out of existence except perhaps for those that
fortuitously can combine to construct and operate joint wells. If the
continued existence of small family farms is a societal goal, then pumping
levels should be coordinated with that.
The same type of issue arises with potentially greater stakes when
agricultural uses come into conflict with municipal or industrial uses that
can afford to pump water from substantially greater depths. Does the
agrarian way of life have some special merit, not reflected in market
prices, that entitles it to insulation from the forces of economics? Frank
Trelease has observed:
In much of the rural west water is held almost in reverence. Water
rights are heirlooms to be treasured beyond their intrinsic value.
There is real resistance to the notion that water is an article of
52. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 2266(a) (Supp. 1982) (reaffirmation of policy to foster and encourage
small farms in Food and Agriculture Act of 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§90.66.010 to
90.66.9 10 (Supp. 1982) (Family Farm Water Act).
53. The provision of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, supra note 52, states in part: "Congress
hereby specifically reaffirms the historical policy of the United States to foster and encourage the
family farm system of agriculture in this country. Congress firmly believes that the maintenance of
the family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well-being of the Nation and the
competitive production of adequate supplies of food and fiber. Congress further believes that any
significant expansion of nonfamily owned large-scale corporate farming enterprises will be detri-
mental to the national welfare." Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 102(a),
91 Stat. 913, 918.
54. See text infra at note 60 for discussion of a broader view of economic efficiency.
55. See Corey, Size of Farm in Relation to Irrigation Pumping Costs, 12 TRANSACTIONS AM.
SOC'Y AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS 795 (1969).
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commerce and subject to trading in the market place. The notion
persists that water for cattle, for hay, for fodder, for feed grain, for
cash crops is the highest and best use of the resource. 56
Where this notion is translated into law, which is mainly in the context
of water right transfers,57 it appears to represent a merit good preference
based more on pure autocracy (the power of a political elite) than on any
of the other three rationales for merit goods. A question yet to be answered
is the extent to which a similar, perhaps unwritten, policy will operate
in the reasonable pumping level context.
In summary, pumping levels in some appropriation doctrine states may
have to be coordinated with groundwater use preference statutes. Family
farm or rural lifestyle policy may also be relevant in some areas. One
way to examine these considerations is to view them in light of the merit
good concept from the field of public finance.
Other Social Goals (Besides Distributional Preferences)
Economic Efficiency Broadly Viewed
Whether there are any resource allocation goals apart from economic
efficiency and distributional preferences depends upon how broadly one
defines those two goals, especially the efficiency goal. The potential
Pareto improvement criterion of efficiency seeks to maximize net resource
benefits over time.58 Much of the theoretical resource allocation literature
takes a broad view of what to count as the benefits and costs of a proposed
course of action: all positive and negative effects that are of social concern
should be counted, whether or not they are items of commerce or can be
valued in market terms.59 Thus, the calculation would include numerous
nonmarket items of personal utility or disutility such as environmental
amenities.
At the theoretical level, this broad view of economic efficiency has
even been extended to take into account distributional preferences. This
extension is achieved simply by postulating that people care about not
56. Trelease, Federal-State Problems in Packaging Water Rights in ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
FDN., Water Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute, Paper 9, Pg. 11 (1978).
57. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-222(1) (Supp. 1982) (no change from agricultural use to another
use is allowed if that would significantly affect the agricultural base of the area); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 85-2-402(3) (1981) (appropriator of more than 15 cubic feet per second may not change
from agricultural use to industrial use).
58. Net benefits means benefits minus costs. The time dimension requires discounting future
benefits and costs to present value. See E. MISHAN, supra note 6, Part IV; P. SASSONE & W.
SCHAFFER, supra note 4, ch. 6.
59. See, e.g., E. MISHAN, supra note 6, at 126; R. SUGDEN & A. WILLIAMS, THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 93 (1978); Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 15 at 1094 & n. I. One of the costs of any resource allocation rule would, of course, be the
administrative cost of implementing it.
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only how much they have themselves but whether others have enough.
If personal utilities are interdependent in this fashion, then the distribution
of income becomes an item of personal utility or disutility that fits within
the theoretical efficiency calculus. 60
Of course, it is one thing to have a broad economic efficiency criterion
in theory and quite another to apply it in practice. Much effort has been
devoted to developing methods of "shadow pricing" for items that are
not traded in the market or are traded at prices which are thought to be
distorted. 6' Yet economists generally agree that at least some items cannot
be assigned reliable shadow prices either at all or at a cost low enough
to make the effort worthwhile. 62 In those cases, the cost-benefit analyst
is advised to list the items separately and describe them in nondollar
terms.63
In a sense, it may not make much difference whether items that are
not readily and accurately valued in dollars are treated under (a) the
efficiency goal but separately described in nondollar terms or (b) a separate
category of other social goals and described in nondollar terms. Either
way the hard questions remain. What, if any, such items are of concern
under the reasonable pumping level statutes and related appropriation
doctrine laws and traditions? And how can they be evaluated in relation
to more tangible concerns? These questions are considered below with
respect to two items-being there first and security of investment.
Being There First as a Value in Its Own Right
Calabresi and Melamed use a threefold classification of factors bearing
on resource allocation-economic efficiency, distributional goals, and
other justice reasons.' Since they take a fairly broad view of economic
efficiency and distributional goals, they acknowledge difficulty in finding
anything to put in their other justice reasons category. They suggest,
though, that dialogue about resource allocation may be enlightened by
putting into this category "reasons which, though possibly originally
linked to efficiency, have now a life of their own" and "reasons which,
though distributional, cannot be described in terms of broad principles
60. The leading article is Hochman & Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. ECON.
REV. 542 (1969); see also J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECO-
NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 120-22 (1973). This approach will not fully collapse distri-
butional preferences into economic efficiency, though, unless one also postulates that individual
preferences are aligned with societal preferences.
61. See, e.g., E. MISHAN, supra note 6, chs. 13 & 14; P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra
note 4, ch. 5; R. SUGDEN & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 59, ch. 8.
62. See P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra note 4, at 51. There is disagreement, however,
on how many of these items cannot be assigned shadow prices.
63. See, e.g., E. MISHAN, supra note 6, at 406-07; P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra
note 4, at 34-37; R. SUGDEN & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 59, at 180-81.
64. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1093-1105.
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like equality. "6 5 Their most specific example is the significance in the
law of nuisance attached to "being there first," by which they no doubt
have in mind the doctrine of coming to the nuisance. 66 Although they
recognize that the significance of "being there first" might be part of
either a long run efficiency goal based on protecting expectancies or a
distributional goal, they imply that it might also be part of an independent
concept of justice.67
Obviously, the priority principle of the appropriation doctrine attaches
great significance to being there first. Whether this significance has some
independent basis, apart from long run efficiency or distribution, is an
intriguing possibility but unfortunately one about which little hard evi-
dence can be adduced either to prove or to disprove it. Of interest,
however, is the observation of a leading water law scholar that time
priority features exist in numerous water law systems throughout the
world. He concluded that time priority represents "the verbal identifi-
cation of a very widespread human trait." 68
Security of Investment as a Value in Its Own Right
Security of investment is a pervasive theme of the appropriation doc-
trine. Senior appropriators are given security by the priority principle.
Junior appropriators are given security, to the extent possible in view of
their status, by the related rules that (1) a junior is entitled to the main-
tenance of stream conditions existing as of the time of his appropriation 69
and (2) no appropriator can change the point of diversion, place of use,
or nature of use of his right if that will injure any other appropriator
including juniors.7" The security of investment afforded by these rules
originally served and continues to serve the function of promoting full
economic development of water resources.
Yet, to paraphrase Calabresi and Melamed, one wonders whether se-
curity of investment, though linked to efficiency, now has a life of its
own. The appropriation doctrine prohibits unreasonably wasteful diver-
sion, transportation and use of water, but generally the courts have been
quite reluctant to require appropriators to use better methods to avoid
waste than are customary in the community.7' Perhaps the security of
65. Id. at 1105.
66. That the defendant was there first and the plaintiff came later is a relevant factor, though
generally not decisive in itself, bearing on whether the defendant is liable for committing a nuisance.
See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 231-33 (1978).
67. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1123.
68. Trelease, supra note 29, at 414-415.
69. This rule is discussed in 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 25, at 576-77.
70. Id. at 623-44.
71. Fisher, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals in D. HABER & S. BER-
GEN, THE LAWS OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 75, 108-
09 (1956).
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investment derived from this deference to custom is based entirely on a
long term efficiency goal, i.e., protection of expectancies to encourage
investment. However, there may be more to it than that. At least one
commentator has suggested that the courts seem more deferential to cus-
tom in applying the rule against waste of water than in analogous tort
law negligence cases.72 The prevailing view in the latter is that customary
safety practices in an industry are relevant but far from controlling on
the issue of reasonable care by the defendant. Thus, the law seems to
give more security to investors in water development under the appro-
priation doctrine than to industrial investors generally. Could it be that
security of investment has come to have a life of its own in appropriation
doctrine water law that is not matched in the tort law of negligence?
Modest support for such a hypothesis can be found in a turn of the
century study of irrigation in several arid regions of the world by French
geographer Jean Brunhes. 73 He looked for relationships between the phys-
ical environment and the organization and regulation of economic activity.
He reached three conclusions: (1) menacing irregular natural environ-
ments create psychological uncertainty that varies with the degree and
type of physical hazard; (2) generally people seek to free themselves from
such psychological uncertainty by associating their common interests
under fixed laws; but (3) whether and exactly how they do so depends
on their attitudes toward cooperation and individualism, which in turn is
a function of various ethnic, historic, legal and political influences. If
Brunhes is correct, it would hardly be surprising if the water law system
developed by settlers in the arid west was designed (in part) to free them
from psychological uncertainty about water supply and thus included
something of a fixation on security of investment going beyond the dollar
value of the goods produced with the water.
If security of investment has a life of its own, in theory it could be
measured in dollars and treated under the economic efficiency goal (even
if that goal is viewed in a narrow marketplace sense). Security of in-
vestment as a value in its own right is readily subject to dominion by
one person to the exclusion of others, so that others who want it would
have to pay to get it. Thus, security of investment is readily subject to
pricing and market exchange.74
72. J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 273-74
(1968).
73. J. BRUNHES, ETUDE DE GEOGRAPHIC HUMAINE: L'IRRIGATION SES CONDI-
TIONS GEOGRAPHIQUES, SES MODES, ET SON ORGANISATION DANS LA PENINSULE
IBERIQUE ET DANS L'AFRIQUE DU NORD 429-39 (1902). Brunhes work is discussed in A.
MAASS & R. ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 9-10, 399-400. 1 wish to thank Mary Ann Lyman
for translating portions of Brunhes for me from the original French.
74. The reason some values are not priced by the market is that for physical or other reasons
they lack the characteristic of excludability. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 2,
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With irrigated farmland, for example, if the security of investment
associated with pumping level stability is a value in its own right that
transcends the dollar value of the crops to be produced with the water,
this value should be reflected in the market price of the farmland. 75 In
theory, then, one might expect to measure this value in dollars by com-
paring the market prices of different farms that are essentially identical
except for the stability or instability of the pumping levels of their ground-
water rights. The price differential might be due partly to a capitalization
of the expected greater net crop income from lower pumping costs on
the parcel with a more stable pumping level, and partly to a payment for
security of investment as a value in its own right transcending expected
net crop income. Allocation of the price differential between these causes
may be difficult if not impossible, but allocation would be unnecessary
since the important objective would be to quantify in dollars all the
benefits or costs associated with greater security of investment.
76
Measuring security of investment as an end in itself through the com-
parative land price approach encounters difficulties in practice, however. 77
Gathering a data base of truly comparable parcels with differing pumping
level security would be no easy task. Even then, the difference in market
price may understate security of investment as a value for its own sake
because of the effect of property taxes. If security has a value in its own
right transcending the net dollar value of goods produced with the water,
the market price of high security land should be higher than low security
land. If land is assessed for property taxes according to its market value,
the property tax burden of high security land would in turn increase. 78
By hypothesis, though, security in its own right will not add to the flow
of net income from the property and help to pay the higher property taxes.
Thus, the cost to a buyer of high security land is not only the initial
higher market price but also the future higher property tax burden.
Since part of what the buyer is willing to pay to get the more stable
at 52-53; J. SINDEN & A. WORRELL, UNPRICED VALUES: DECISIONS WITHOUT MARKET
PRICES 433-36 (1979).
75. The demand for land is a function of all of its characteristics that are of utility to consumers,
and in theory the annual flow of utility can be capitalized to measure the value of the land. J.
SINDEN & A. WORRELL, supra note 74, at 291.
76. Double counting must be avoided, of course. One could not count both the net dollar value
of increased crop production and increased land prices that reflect a capitalization of increased crop
income. On double counting in irrigation projects, see A. GIFFORD, JR. & G. SANTONI, PUBLIC
ECONOMICS: POLITICIANS, PROPERTY AND EXCHANGE 71 (1979); E. MISHAN, supra
note 6, at 78-80.
77. Cf. R. SUGDEN & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 59, at 161-62 (reporting that because of
such difficulties the comparative land price approach to measure amenities and disamenities has been
successful only for extreme disamenities such as high levels of aircraft noise).
78. This would not be true if, as in Idaho, agricultural land is taxed not according to its market
value but under a capitalization of economic rent or crop rental approach. IDAHO CODE § 63-
105CC (Supp. 1982).
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pumping level will be absorbed by higher property taxes, the initial market
price he will pay for the land is likely to understate the true value to him
of the greater security."9 To illustrate, assume that security of investment
as a value in its own right is worth $400 annually to a buyer. If a four
percent capitalization rate is used, security of investment would add
$10,000 to the price of the land before taxes are considered. With a one
percent tax levy, annual property taxes would rise $100, leaving a net
benefit of $300. Applying the same capitalization rate to a net benefit of
$300, the actual increase in market price would be $7,500 rather than
$10,000.
If security of investment has a life of its own that is difficult to measure
in dollars, some other means to evaluate its importance would be useful.
As a start in this direction, one might note that the security of a water
user's investment is a function of more than pumping level stability. For
example, irrigators are subject to considerable fluctuation in the cost of
such factors of production as fertilizer, energy and borrowed capital.
Their crop production can vary due to hail, wind, frost, insects and plant
disease. Furthermore, the selling prices of their crops fluctuate. With all
these variables, the question is whether legal regulation of pumping levels
can make much of a contribution to an irrigator's security of investment.
On the other hand, one might ask whether such regulation nonetheless
has a useful role in combination with other governmental efforts to prevent
other variables from fluctuating too widely, e.g., crop price supports,
crop disaster aid programs, and efforts to control interest rates.
SUMMARY
The earlier article suggested the reasonable pumping level statutes
invite the construction that they contemplate a goal of economic efficiency.
That article discussed efficiency in the sense of maximizing net ground-
water values that are measured in the marketplace. The present article
has sought to explore the significance under the pumping level statutes
of social goals-distributional and otherwise. Since the pumping level
statutes tend to be vacuously worded, this article has focused mainly on
related appropriation doctrine laws and traditions rather than on specific
language in the pumping level statutes.
The exploration indicates that the common law priority principle started
out with a wealth distribution facet that may well have some continuing
vitality in appropriation doctrine states. Also, groundwater use preference
statutes exist in some appropriation doctrine states. In a sense, these
statutes constitute a merit good preference. Possibly some other policies
akin to merit good preferences may come into play, e.g., a preference
79. See J. SINDEN & A. WORRELL, supra note 74, at 299.
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for an agrarian lifestyle. Finally, but by no means clearly, general ap-
propriation doctrine laws and traditions may include other values that are
not priced directly or separately in the marketplace, namely, a special
justice dimension to being there first and a life of its own for security of
investment.
The important question, of course, is: How significant are these dis-
tributional or other social values under particular reasonable pumping
level statutes? As noted earlier, the Colorado and Idaho reasonable pump-
ing level statutes explicitly recognize tension or potential conflict between
achieving economic development and protecting the diversion systems
of senior appropriators.8" These statutes allow, if not require, an agency
or court that makes pumping level decisions to consider various nonef-
ficiency concerns that might be express or implicit in broader appropri-
ation doctrine laws and traditions. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that
other western legislatures intended to make economic efficiency in a
narrow marketplace sense the only goal when the vacuously worded
reasonable pumping level statutes are read in their broader appropriation
doctrine context.
Perhaps the strongest case against considering social goals can be built
upon the Nevada reasonable pumping level statute, since it is more specific
than most in stating what factors should be considered. After stating that
a groundwater appropriation is subject to reasonable lowering of the static
water level at the point of diversion, the statute says: "In determining
such reasonable lowering of the static water level in a particular area,
the state engineer shall consider the economics of pumping water for the
general type of crops growing and may also consider the effect of water
use on the economy of the area in general." 8' One might argue that by
stating what "shall" and "may also" be considered, the statute precludes
consideration of anything else.
It would seem prudent, however, for the state engineer in Nevada to
consider other statutes that expressly authorize him to give certain water
uses preferred status82 and to limit the depth of domestic wells in des-
ignated groundwater areas.83 Furthermore, even if the pumping level
statute were construed to allow him to consider only the factors listed,
this construction would not necessarily limit the inquiry to economic
efficiency in a narrow marketplace sense. The directive to look at "the
economics of pumping water for the general type of crops growing" in
the area seems intended to protect the growing of such crops, at least to
80. See text supra at notes 17 and 18.
81. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(4) (1981).
82. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.120(2) (1981).
83. NEV. REV. STAT. §534.120(3) (1981). NEV. REV. STAT. §534.030 (1981) states the
procedures for declaration of designated groundwater areas.
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some extent, even though that may not be the most efficient use for the
water. Although this directive could be aimed at long run efficiency by
protecting expectancies, it sounds very much like either a merit good
type preference for existing crops or a desire to provide security of in-
vestment for existing uses (customary uses) as an end in itself.84
The statutory authorization to consider also "the effect of water use
on the economy of the area in general" would allow the state engineer
to weigh or blend into his decision the goal of economic efficiency in
groundwater allocation. But even this language is not necessarily limited
in scope to narrow marketplace efficiency. Arguably, the authorization to
consider the "economy" of the area in general opens the door to looking
at family farm policy and wealth distribution considerations since the
character of an economy can depend on how wealth is distributed within
it.85
CONCLUSION
The earlier article opened by quoting the following statement about
the reasonable pumping level concept from a National Water Commission
study: "No definitive guidelines exist as to what the measure of reason-
ableness is or how it will be applied." 86 Although the reasonable pumping
level statutes incompletely enumerate factors that should bear on the
measure of reasonableness, the root cause of the uncertainty lies deeper.
Additional factors can be ascertained from study of appropriation doctrine
laws and traditions, albeit with varying degrees of clarity. Definitive
guidelines in the sense of rules that will yield mechanical answers, how-
ever, are impossible or at least unwise. Unless one is willing to accept
a simplistic, tunnel vision approach, the need is inevitable to weigh
potentially competing concerns about economic efficiency, wealth and
merit good distribution, and (perhaps) other social goals.
The task then is to develop procedures to achieve knowledgeable and
responsible weighing of such concerns. The essence of the problem is
captured by the following commentary upon water management under
the Alaska water code. That code allows new appropriations only for uses
that will be in the public interest, and it enumerates a number of factors
84. See the discussion of custom and security of investment as an end in itself, in text supra at
notes 64-73.
85. The pattern of wealth distribution can, of course, affect the demand for various consumer
items, which in turn determines what is an efficient allocation of resources. See Kennedy, supra
note 10, at 422.
86. Grant, supra note 1, at 1, quoting NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY
DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 56 (1973).
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bearing on the public interest. 87 Despite the enumeration Frank Trelease,
the code's principal draftsman, has commented:
Making decisions such as these will be very difficult. No law can
make them. They must be made by people. No economic formula
can solve these problems by push button techniques .... It is be-
lieved that the real strength of the Code lies in its procedures, which
will enable all viewpoints to be brought together and all factors
considered, so that choices will be made, not by action of an ap-
propriator or polluter, and not to further the policy of a single purpose
agency, but on an informed basis by officials responsible to the State
for "maximum use consistent with the public interest" for the "max-
imum benefit of (all) its people." 8"
Similarly, the strongest approach to the pumping level problem seems to
be to use procedures which will enable all viewpoints to be brought
together and all factors considered, so that choices will be made on an
informed basis by officials responsible to the state for the maximum benefit
of all its people.89 The reasonable pumping level statutes are readily
adaptable to that approach.
87. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b) (1977): "In determining the public interest, the commissioner
shall consider (1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation; (2) the effect
of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation; (3) the effect on fish and game
resources and on public recreational opportunities; (4) the effect on public health; (5) the effect of
loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable time if not precluded or
hindered by the proposed appropriation; (6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed
appropriation; (7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; and (8) the
effect upon access to navigable or public waters."
88. F. TRELEASE, A WATER CODE FOR ALASKA 17 (1962), excerpted in F. TRELEASE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 146, 148 (3d ed. 1979).
89. Cf. C. CORKER, supra note 2, at xviii-xix ("The most that can be hoped is mechanisms
which permit flexible and ad hoc solutions applicable to a particular basin, designed to achieve
maximum net benefit and to avoid offending community concepts of distributive justice.").
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